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Privacy

Four statements, each one checkable in the source. If this page and the code ever disagree, the code is what happened and this page is the bug.

What is stored

Sign-in attempts record a hashed IP address: sha256 of the address plus a server-side salt, truncated to its first 16 hex characters. The raw address is never written to the database and never appears in a log line.

Alongside it, an audit table keeps what happened — the actor, the action, the target and a timestamp. That is the whole record. There is no page-view history and no profile built from any of it.

No third-party scripts

Nothing on this site is loaded from another origin: no analytics, no tag manager, no session recorder, no embedded widgets. The two typefaces are downloaded at build time and served from this domain by the framework itself, so a visit makes no request to a font CDN.

Because there is nothing to consent to, there is no cookie banner. Exactly two cookies exist: the session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure in production) and a one-hour request-id cookie that is readable by our own error page so you can quote the id of a failing request. It holds a random identifier, no account and no history — delete it and nothing breaks.

Access tokens and device authorisation

An access token for a terminal or desktop app is stored as a sha256 hash of its secret. The value itself is shown once, in the response that creates it, and never written here again — losing one means creating another. Alongside the hash we keep the public twelve-character prefix, the name you gave it, its permissions, its lifetime and the time it was last used (written at most once a minute).

When you approve a device we keep the code it printed, the client name, the permissions you agreed to and when you decided. That code is stored in plain text, because you had to read it on one screen and type it on another; it expires after fifteen minutes and the row is deleted a day later. Revoked and expired tokens are deleted after 90 days.

Revoking a token — or changing your password — stops it working immediately. A token only ever carries the three listed permissions and can never act as an administrator.

Sessions and email

Signing out revokes the session on the server immediately: the row is deleted and the cookie cleared, so a copy of the cookie stops working at once. Revoking a single device from the security page does the same thing for that device only.

We send transactional email — six messages, all triggered by something you did: an address confirmation, a confirmation for a new address, a password reset link, "your password was changed", "your address was changed", and a security notice when the address on the account changes or is removed. Nothing else: no newsletters, no receipts, no marketing, no tracking pixel and no remote images, so we cannot tell whether a message was opened.

What we store: the address you typed (with its capitalisation), its lowercased form, whether it has been confirmed, and — for every link we send — a sha256 hash of the token, the address it was bound to and its expiry. The plaintext token exists only inside the message. Delivered messages are kept 30 days and dead letters 90 days; spent tokens 30 days.

What we do not promise: delivery. A message is queued and retried, and best-effort delivery is all any sender without a provider guarantee can offer — an address typed wrong, a provider that drops the mail and a spam filter all look identical from here. An unconfirmed address is a claim, not ownership: if the real mailbox owner later confirms it, the address moves to their account, and we cannot notify the previous holder because we no longer hold that address.